PRIVACY AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY
MAINTENANCE
Jonathan Kahn∗

INTRODUCTION
Privacy occupies a central place in the western liberal tradition
as an essential component of self-definition and individual
1
development. The meaning of privacy, however, has proven elusive.
Legal scholars and philosophers have variously characterized privacy
as a social situation of autonomy, a claim, a psychological state, a
2
physical area, or a form of control.
More specific definitions
include: privacy as a psychological condition of “being apart from
3
4
others,” “freedom not to participate in the activities of others,” “a
social ritual by means of which an individual’s moral title to his
5
existence is conferred,” “a boundary through which information
6
does not flow from the persons who possess it to others,” “the state of
limited access by others . . . to certain modes of being in a person’s
7
life,” “the exclusive right to dispose of access to one’s property
8
9
(private) domain,” “intermediate goods” involving the “concealment
∗
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See generally ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1968). For a thorough
review of recent legal and philosophical critiques of privacy, see JUDITH WAGNER
DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY (1997),
especially chapters 2, 3, and 4.
2
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980).
3
Richard Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276 (1974).
4
Id.
5
Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39
(1976).
6
Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Consequences and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 281, 282 (1966).
7
C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 6 (1983).
8
Ernst Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in PRIVACY: NOMOS XIII 150-51 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
9
Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978).
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of information about themselves that others might use to their
10
disadvantage,” and as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
11
extent information about them is communicated to others.”
Control seems to be a common concern of many definitions,
whether of information, territory, or the self. Thus privacy has been
12
defined as control over: “knowledge about oneself,” “the intimacies
13
14
of personal identity,” “acquaintance with one’s personal affairs,”
“disclosures [of confidential information] by others when disclosures
15
do not, or no longer, serve associational interests,” “decisions
concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the
16
agent’s love, caring, or liking,” and finally “control over who can
17
sense us.”
This Article provides a historical commentary on the meaning of
privacy, drawing from various genres, including philosophy,
literature, and English and American jurisprudence. Its primary
concern is not to provide an authoritative definition of privacy, but
rather to consider how existing literature on privacy recognizes,
constructs, and otherwise implicates identity and the integrity of the
self as legal and/or social values. Integral to this concern is
approaching privacy as a regulative principle for constructing and
managing relations between the individual and three primary spheres
18
of engagement: society, the market, and the state. Contemporary
10

Richard Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
WESTIN, supra note 1, at 7. Westin also describes four states of individual
privacy: Solitude, in which “the individual is separated from the group and freed from
the observation of other persons”; Intimacy, in which “the individual is acting as a part
of a small unit that claims and is allowed to exercise corporate seclusion so that it
may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank relationship between two or more
individuals”; Anonymity, which “occurs when the individual is in public places or
performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and
surveillance”; and Reserve, which entails “the creation of a psychological barrier
against unwanted intrusion.” Id. at 31.
12
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968); see also William A. Parent, A
New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 305, 306 (1983) (defining privacy
as “the condition of not having undocumented personal information about oneself
known by others”). Parent combines the idea of privacy as a condition with a
concern for control over information. Id.
13
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977).
14
Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY: NOMOS XIII 169 ( J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
15
Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1151 (1992).
16
JULIE C. INNES, PRIVACY, INTIMACY AND ISOLATION 91 (1992).
17
Parker, supra note 3, at 280.
18
By society, I mean that sphere of engagement beyond the family where
11

2003

PRIVACY—IDENTITY MAINTENANCE

373

analyses of privacy tend to concentrate on how privacy protects the
individual from state tyranny or the prying eyes of social busy bodies.
Much less attention has been paid, however, to privacy as a principle
for demarcating a space beyond the reach of market forces. Here is
where my concern for identity takes the fore. As privacy recognizes
and protects the conditions necessary for proper individuation and
realization of the self over time, it stands in stark opposition to the
expansive forces of the modern market, which reduces everything
that comes within its grasp to a common medium of exchange.
I will argue that the existing literature on privacy lays the
groundwork for a consideration of how the law constructs and
manages the principle of identity. At the core of this process lies the
concern to define and protect certain dignitary interests that some
view as critical to maintaining the integrity of the self in the face of
modern social, economic, and political forces. Privacy, in short,
provides principles for negotiating the legal management of
personhood in a manner that facilitates the development and
maintenance of a coherent individual identity essential to our liberal
polity’s commitment to human flourishing.
Among these principles are a commitment to maintaining the
conditions necessary for proper individuation and realization of the
self over time. In particular, this involves the legal recognition and
protection of a sphere of personhood beyond the reach of market
forces. In such a sphere, a person may choose to locate aspects of
herself that may not be rendered fungible or commensurable with
other objects through a market exchange. More generally, the
literature also reveals the potential for recognizing privacy as a means
through which society itself is constituted. As a principle of
community maintenance, privacy casts the construction of the self as
a relational, social process that implicates identities drawn from
powerful historical and social affiliations. In this context, privacy
challenges the notion of the bounded self and provides legal
principles that construct identity as contingent, open, and shifting
across time and space. Privacy is also ultimately grounded in a
concern to protect the basic dignity implicated in allowing a person
individuals join together and interact in a wide array of engagements of a primarily
non-economic character.
This approximates the sphere of civil society, of
Tocqueville-like association, and the general encounters of everyday life. By the
market, I refer to that sphere of interaction governed primarily by economic
considerations, where individual activity is oriented toward providing goods and
services that are rendered commensurable by being arrayed along a continuous
common medium of exchange. By the state, I refer to the formal operations of the
institutions and apparatus of governance given sanction by the law and backed by the
legitimized use of force.
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to negotiate this complex terrain with a measure of autonomy and
control over the process of developing an individuated self, capable
of human flourishing.
I. PRIVACY AND THE INVIOLATE PERSONALITY
During the nineteenth century a framework of privacy law
developed around legal concerns ranging from protection of
correspondence, to discussions of trespass upon the home, to
19
trademark infringement and protection of the confessional. In his
influential treatise on the law of torts, Judge Thomas Cooley referred
20
to “the right to be left alone” as a personal immunity. And in 1890,
E.L. Godkin, the prominent editor of The Nation, wrote of the
citizen’s “right to his own reputation” as “the very first form of
individual property,” and warned against “violations of the rights to
21
privacy” as a threat to social order and civil peace. But it was Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis who first fully elaborated on the principle
22
of privacy as a right deserving of legal recognition and protection.
In a now legendary law review article, Warren and Brandeis
reviewed the diverse strands of legal, political, and social commentary
relating to issues of privacy and wove them together into a coherent
argument for a legally distinct right to privacy grounded in a concern
23
for “man’s spiritual nature.” To Warren and Brandeis, privacy did
19

See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1892 (1981) [hereinafter Right to Privacy].
20
THOMAS COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
21
E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen. IV. To His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER’S
MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 59-65.
22
For a thorough review of the right to privacy in the nineteenth century, see
Right to Privacy, supra note 19. The Note argues that far from creating a new right,
Warren and Brandeis merely provided the clearest articulation of what, by 1890, was
a tradition of “ample and explicit protection of privacy in its own right.” Id. at 1894.
Warren and Brandeis probably would not quarrel with this interpretation. Indeed,
they did their best to build their argument on what they saw as existing precedent for
establishing a right to privacy. As Ronald Dworkin notes of their work, it may be,
however, that the new principle strikes out on a different line, so that it justifies a
precedent or a series of precedents on grounds very different from what their
opinions propose. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 119 (1977).
Brandeis and Warren’s famous argument about the right to privacy is a dramatic
illustration: they argued that this right was not unknown to the law, but was, on the
contrary, demonstrated by a wide variety of decisions, in spite of the fact that the
judges who decided these cases mentioned no such right. Id.
23
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). Like all good legends, the article even has its own creation myths.
William Prosser, writing seventy years later, attributed the article to Warren’s outrage
at the press’ intrusive coverage of his daughter’s wedding. The image of the right to
privacy as the product of an outraged brahmin’s delicate sensibilities held sway for
years until James Barron debunked it in 1979. Barron showed that Warren’s
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not involve property so much as the “more general right of the
24
individual to be let alone.” Their goal was largely to “disentangle
25
privacy from property,” and their great accomplishment was
26
articulating privacy as a freestanding basic right.
Warren and Brandeis grounded the right to privacy in principles
27
of human dignity and the “inviolate personality.” Similarly, the first
case to recognize a right to privacy, Pavesich v. New England Life
28
Insurance Co., expressed concern that the use of a person’s name or
image for a commercial purpose without his consent constituted an
assault upon the integrity of his persona that effectively enslaved a
part of him. In this context, privacy rights are rooted not simply in
dignity, but more specifically in dignity as manifested in the integrity
of one’s individual identity or persona. The court in Pavesich clearly
expressed a concern that the expansive forces of the modern market
29
threatened to efface individual identity. As Edward Bloustein noted
in his commentary on the case:
use of a photograph for trade purposes turns a man into a
commodity and makes him serve the economic needs and
interests of others. In a community at all sensitive to the
commercialization of human values, it is degrading to thus make
30
a man a part of commerce against his will.

Writing seventy years after Warren and Brandeis, William Prosser
set the standard for modern assessment of the invasion of privacy by

daughter was not married around the time of the article (a cousin of his was married
in 1890 but press reports of it were restrained and not out of the ordinary) and that
claims that Warren was unduly sensitive to intrusions on private concerns lacked firm
support. See James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law
Review 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 892912 (1979).
24
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205.
25
Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 648 (1991).
26
David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort
Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 779-80 (1991).
27
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205. Bloustein defines the “inviolate
personality” as “the individual’s independence, dignity, and integrity; it defines
man’s essence as a unique and self-determining being.” Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy
As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971
(1964).
28
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
29
Id. at 80.
30
Bloustein, supra note 27, at 988. For more on the origins of the tort of invasion
of privacy and its relation to emerging concerns over the newly expansive forces of
the modern national market economy, see generally Jonathan Kahn, Enslaving the
Image: The Origins of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity Reconsidered, 2 LEGAL THEORY
301, 301-24 (1996).
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fracturing the concept into four distinct torts: intrusion into private
affairs, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light, and
31
appropriation of name or likeness for commercial benefit. Prosser’s
taxonomy of privacy repudiated the legacy of Warren and Brandeis by
denying the difference between privacy and property interests and
“by suggesting that privacy is not an independent value at all but
rather a composite of the interests in reputation, emotional
32
tranquility and intangible property.”
In response to Prosser, Bloustein tried to reunify the tort of
33
invasion of privacy under the umbrella of injuries to human dignity.
Bloustein accepted Prosser’s four-part division of the tort of invasion
of privacy, but in keeping with Warren and Brandeis, he argued that
privacy must be recognized as an independent right, implicating not
34
property but one’s very self or individuality. Bloustein asserted that
the basic social value underlying all torts of invasion of privacy was a
35
concern for human dignity. In particular, Bloustein also infused
Prosser’s tort of appropriation of identity with a concern for the
36
commodification of the individual persona.
The tort, Bloustein
argued, was not about the “misappropriation of something of
37
pecuniary value,” it was about “demeaning and humiliating” the
individual through “the commercialization of an aspect of
38
personality.”
Hyman Gross provides a sympathetic critique of Bloustein,
asserting that although Bloustein indicates why privacy is valuable, he
39
never adequately defines it.
Gross believes that Bloustein’s
identification of privacy as an aspect of human dignity is apt, but
40
faults his failure to specify which aspect. Gross defines privacy as a
41
function of control over access to personal affairs, but he does not
31

William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
See Bloustein, supra note 27, at 971.
33
Id. at 974.
34
Id. at 987.
35
Id. at 974.
36
Id. at 987.
37
Id. at 968.
38
Bloustein, supra note 27, at 987. Bloustein’s work, in turn, was subject to much
criticism; most of it was a sympathetic appreciation of his concern for dignity that
nonetheless asserted such an interest was simply too broad and amorphous to be of
practical use. See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 13, at 250-53, 259; Tim Frazer, Appropriation
of Personality-A New Tort?, 99 L. Q. REV. 281, 296 (1980); Dianne Zimmerman, Requiem
for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’ Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
291, 339 (1983) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight].
39
Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35 (1967).
40
Id. at 51-52.
41
Id. at 35-36.
32
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elaborate on the relation between privacy, dignity, and identity. This
must be the focus of inquiry if our concern is not so much with
42
privacy per se, but with the evolving status of identity before the law.
While Bloustein’s focus remains on dignity and privacy, he does
not fully consider their further relation to identity. The harm to
dignity caused by invasions of privacy ultimately implicates the
integrity of individual identity. Bloustein is clearly concerned with
this, but he tends to assert the relation rather than explore and
analyze it. Dignity and identity, of course, are hardly easier to define
than privacy. Yet by considering the relation of dignity to privacy, we
can develop a more complete understanding of the principles
underlying particular rules that implicate the legal recognition and
construction of identity.
42

Tom Gerety agrees that privacy is one single concept and thus definable. He
characterizes it, however, as “an autonomy, or control over the intimacies of personal
identity.” Gerety, supra note 13, at 236. Gerety thus focuses on identity more
explicitly than Bloustein, but he also criticizes Bloustein’s characterization of privacy
as a dignitary interest as being too broad and undifferentiated. Id. at 250-59. Tim
Frazer, among others, shares this criticism. See Frazer, supra note 38, at 296.
Like Laurence Tribe, Gerety distinguishes between public and private aspects of
identity. He asserts the following,
Our personalities and our dignities are no doubt most surely and
tightly enmeshed in the private world over which we exercise, at times,
considerable sway. But whether we like it or not, our selves also extend
outside of that world into another in which most of us have very little
power or expectation of power over the opinions and impressions
others may form of us. Every affront to our dignity in that outer world,
while felt, even keenly, in our inner world, is not a legally cognizable
assault upon our private selves.
Gerety, supra note 13, at 259-260. Gerety rightly raises concerns that Bloustein’s
conception of dignitary harm may be too broad, but his distinction between pubic
and private selves misses the point by, in effect, conflating what Alan Gewirth
identifies as “empirical” and “inherent” dignity. Every day each of us may suffer
insult to empirical dignity, to our ability to conduct ourselves in a “dignified”
manner. Bloustein, and Warren and Brandeis before him, however, is concerned
with deeper insults to our inherent dignity, a kind of intrinsic worth at the core of
individual identity. That core of identity is not simply about personal “intimacies,” it
implicates our very sense of self and deserves protection whether in public or private.
Thus, when Gerety goes on to assert that the tort of appropriation of identity does
not involve privacy because it is a matter of controlling aspects of the identity that
“face outward,” he overlooks the fact that the harm of appropriation does not only
implicate how an individual may choose to present his or her outward identity but
also whether to present an outward face in the first place. Id. at 250-53.
Gerety in effect reduces the harm of appropriation to a matter of reputation or
simple unjust enrichment when he asserts that existing law relating to fraud and
property rights are adequate to redress any resulting grievances. He wholly fails to
consider that appropriation of identity affects not only how others view you, but also
how you view yourself: as appropriation renders a unique part of your self into a
fungible commodity, it undermines the integrity of your persona, regardless of how
others perceive you.
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Whereas dignity broadly implicates a consideration of the
inherent value of human beings, privacy involves the more focused
right to protect the conditions necessary to individuation. That is,
where dignity broadly conceived is a condition of personhood,
privacy is an attribute of individuality. The liberal tradition connects
the two in so far as it posits that the full realization of one’s
personhood involves articulating and developing one’s individual
43
identity. Assaults on identity affront dignity insofar as they deny the
conditions of individuation necessary to the proper respect for and
development of one’s personhood. Invasions of privacy, therefore,
affront dignity insofar as they undermine the integrity of one’s
identity by: forcing the manifestation of a partial or reductive version
of one’s individuality, more thoroughly effacing one’s individuality,
or otherwise rendering the individual as fungible and non-distinct.
Thus, in answer to Gross’ criticism of Bloustein, it is my assertion that
privacy implicates that aspect of dignity grounded in the belief that a
full realization of one’s personhood requires the recognition of, and
respect for, the conditions necessary for each person to realize her
distinct individual identity.
II. PRIVACY AS A DISTINCT INTEREST
In searching for common privacy-based principles, this Article
breaks from other theories, like Prosser’s, that fragment privacy into
diverse rights. It diverges even more radically from scholars such as
Harry Kalven or Judith Jarvis Thomson who deny the existence of a
distinctive tort of invasion of privacy or characterize it as “petty” at
44
best. Thomson, for example, argues that the right to privacy never
43

See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29-34 (1993); see also Reiman, supra note

5.
44

Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 326-31 (1966); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 303-10 (1975). Prosser, too, viewed privacy as essentially a
derivative right. Prosser, supra note 31, at 389. However, his four-part categorization
nonetheless serves to specify, and thereby contain, specific and relatively
autonomous privacy rights. Others, such as Dianne Zimmerman, critique the right
of privacy as simply irrelevant in a society where the legal protections of the First
Amendment have extended to encompass the dissemination of almost all forms of
information. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight, supra note 38, at 293-94.
One year before Prosser’s article, Privacy, Frederick Davis argued that privacy
was derivative of existing torts such as defamation, intrusion, and property rights. He
criticized privacy and harms resulting from its invasion as subjective and difficult to
measure, and concluded that the right of privacy was “a sociological notion and not a
jural concept at all.” Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean By ‘Right to Privacy?’, 4 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1959). While correct in identifying the sociological component to
privacy, Davis provides no convincing argument for bifurcating sociological, or other
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stands alone but is largely derivative of a cluster of other property45
based rights to resist intrusions.
Thomas Scanlon and Jeffrey Reiman each offer effective
rebuttals to Thomson by situating privacy more broadly in its social
context. Privacy is a distinctive and independent right that “is an
essential part of the complex social practice by means of which the
social group recognizes—and communicates to the individual—that
46
his existence is his own. And this is a precondition to personhood.”
Reiman argues that privacy is therefore “necessary to the creation of
selves out of human beings, since a self is at least in part a human
being who regards his existence—his thoughts, his body, his
47
actions—as his own.”
It is here that Reiman recognizes the
significance of privacy for the constitution of the self, and for the
recognition, construction, and maintenance of individual identity in
and through society. He still employs property-based metaphors of
ownership that place him in the liberal-Lockean tradition, but he is
also open to valuing privacy as a social dynamic. Reiman concludes
that Thomson’s derogation of privacy as a derivative right fails fully to
consider the distinctiveness of the social role privacy plays and its
special place in constituting and respecting the individual in the
48
liberal state. Trespass and nuisance laws enforce respectful social
interactions and protect the physical territory surrounding an
individual, but they do not implicate the same concern for
personhood and identity that underlie privacy.
Scanlon also focuses on the social context by positing a common
foundation for privacy rights “in the special interests we have in being
49
able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions.” In his analysis,
however, Scanlon eschews metaphors of ownership to focus on the
transgression of normative boundaries established by social norms
and conventions. He asserts that a violation in the right to privacy
occurs where there is an invasion of a “conventionally defined zone
50
Scanlon’s concern for boundaries is also classically
of privacy.”
liberal, but his focus on the importance of social norms provides

concerns from jural concerns. He takes a classically hermetic approach to the law,
sealing it off as an independent discipline, pure and chaste, untarnished by social or
historical considerations. Ironically, Prosser’s fragmentation of the tort provided
some of the jural logic behind the concept of privacy that Davis felt was lacking.
45
Thomson, supra note 44, at 303-10.
46
Reiman, supra note 5, at 39.
47
Id. (emphasis in original).
48
Id.
49
Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 315-18 (1975).
50
Id.
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useful insights into the distinctive dynamics of privacy rights.
Robert Post follows up on the work of Reiman and Scanlon,
51
elaborating more fully on the social bases of privacy law. In his
analysis of Warren and Brandeis’ article, Post distinguishes between
52
descriptive and normative privacy.
He understands descriptive
privacy as an amalgam of empirically ascertainable “thoughts,
emotions, [and] sensations” that need protection insofar as they
53
comprise personality itself. To disturb personality is to cause mental
pain and distress. Post alludes to Ruth Gavison’s work in separating
descriptive privacy into the related concepts of “secrecy,”
54
“anonymity,” and “solitude.” Normative privacy is less a matter of
empirical distance from intrusion than of “moral characterization” of
55
certain social relations. It involves “forms of respect that we owe
56
each other as members of a common community.”
The
transgression of these forms of respect violates personality. Post
concludes that privacy in this sense is normative “because it ultimately
57
entails the articulation and application of social norms.” Normative
privacy, therefore, describes why the invasion itself causes harm. Post
argues that the common law conception of privacy is inherently
normative. Nonetheless, he recognizes that diverse theories of
privacy articulate the relation between normative and descriptive
aspects of privacy, emphasizing the one or the other to greater or
58
lesser degrees.
Post’s conception of normative privacy is especially useful in
assessing how privacy-based concerns for dignity implicate the
integrity of individual identity. His elaboration of descriptive privacy,
however, also clearly implicates identity interests, even if in a highly
psychological form. This creates a problem in analyzing the relation
51

Post, supra note 25.
Id. at 650-51.
53
Id. at 650.
54
Id. at 651.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Post, supra note 25, at 652.
58
Id. at 649-53.
Michael Sandel distinguishes between normative and
“voluntarist” privacy. He argues that Griswold’s substantive due process analysis
enacted an essentially normative conception of privacy, whereas Eisenstadt and Roe
marked a shift to a voluntarist notion of privacy that focuses on autonomy of
individual choice rather than on protecting private space. Michael Sandel, Moral
Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 526-28
(1989). Sandel’s distinction between protecting space and protecting choice is
useful but it obscures certain deeper principles underlying both approaches to
privacy—most significantly the common dignitary concern to recognize, define, and
protect the integrity of the individual self.
52
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between law, privacy, and identity insofar as Post posits not only a
distinction, but also a disjunction, between normative and descriptive
privacy. This aspect of his analysis is unnecessary and potentially
misleading. As Post himself observes, various conceptions and
applications of privacy may embody both descriptive and normative
59
concerns to greater or lesser degrees. When focusing on identity,
therefore, it is more useful to place them along a continuum than to
create a dichotomy between them.
III. PRIVACY AND DIGNITY
Beginning at the normative end of the continuum, let us
consider privacy as it explicitly implicates dignity, autonomy, and the
integrity of the self. Bloustein’s response to Prosser is a good starting
point. In his critique of Prosser’s fragmentation of the tort of privacy,
Bloustein posits a common dignitary interest asserted in various
60
privacy cases as a means to reintegrate the right to privacy. Thus,
where Prosser found the gist of the harm in intrusion to be a species
61
of intentional infliction of mental distress, Bloustein contends that
the true harm was “a blow to human dignity, an assault on human
62
personality.”
Such intrusions are “wrongful because they are
demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or not they
63
cause emotional trauma.” Extending this analysis to governmental
intrusion, Bloustein sees intrusion as “the primary weapon of the
64
tyrant.”
Similarly, Bloustein distinguishes invasions of privacy involving
public disclosure from defamation, asserting that “defamation is
founded on loss of reputation while invasion of privacy is founded on
65
an insult to individuality.” Moreover, the tort of appropriation of
identity did not involve a proprietary interest, but rather caused harm
by “demeaning and humiliating” the individual through the
66
“commercialization of an aspect of personality.” Thus, Bloustein
recapitulates the original effort of Warren and Brandeis to articulate
a unitary interest in protecting the intangible spiritual nature of man.
In his essay Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, Louis

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Post, supra note 25, at 653.
Bloustein, supra note 27, at 974.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 981.
Bloustein, supra note 27, at 987.
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Henkin argues that “human dignity requires respect for every
individual’s physical and psychic integrity, for his (her) ‘personhood’
67
before the law, [and] for her (his) autonomy and freedom.”
Henkin’s identification of integrity and personhood as central to
dignity resonates with the core principles underlying the normative
conception of privacy articulated by Bloustein. Privacy is valued
insofar as it fosters the conditions within which an individual may
establish, maintain and develop her identity as a core aspect of
personhood. Thus conceived, invasions of privacy constitute an
affront to human dignity by undermining one’s identity. If our
primary concern is with such affronts, then acts that are individually
experienced and also socially and historically understood as threats to
the integrity of one’s identity begin to define the “boundaries” of
privacy.
Alan Gewirth sets out two concepts of dignity as the basis of
68
human rights: empirical and inherent.
Dignity in the empirical
sense “is a characteristic that is often also signified by its
corresponding adjective, dignified; it is variously, a kind of gravity or
decorum or composure or self-respect or self-confidence together
69
with various good qualities that may justify such attitudes.”
He
argues that empirical dignity may be gained or lost. It is contingent
and hence a consequence of having rights, but it is not “the ground of
70
rights.” Inherent dignity, in contrast, “signifies a kind of intrinsic
71
worth that belongs equally to all human beings as such . . . .” It is
non-fungible and inalienable; thus “[h]aving [inherent] dignity is the
72
equivalent of having rights.”
To a degree, Gewirth’s distinction between empirical and
inherent dignity echoes Post’s distinction between descriptive and
normative privacy. Normative privacy may be conceived as an arena
in which inherent dignity is defined, articulated, and maintained.
Each involves assessing (and enforcing) historical and social
constructions of particular values about the worth of the individual
and the proper boundaries of behavior (both individual and
67

Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 210 (Michael J. Meyer & W.A. Parent
eds., 1992).
68
Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION of
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 11-12 (Michael J. Meyer & W. A.
Parent eds., 1992).
69
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
70
Id. (emphasis in original).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 12-13.
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governmental) in a civilized community or a decent state.
Ironically, the very idea of normative “boundaries” may call forth
a more empirical or descriptive conception of privacy, especially as
the metaphor becomes more spatial. Gewirth, of course, is not
literally talking about spatial boundaries, but his characterization of
dignity as non-fungible and inalienable places it beyond the reach of
market forces. There is an implicit spatial relationship here that
echoes Warren and Brandeis’ concerns to keep certain personal
73
matters out of the public eye. Dignity demands the maintenance of
a space outside of, and perhaps existing in opposition to, the world of
the market. Warren and Brandeis defined that space in terms of
privacy—it is the arena where the non-fungible aspects of the human
74
spirit are protected from a debasing commodification.
In this
respect, according to the Warren and Brandeis model, empirical and
inherent dignities intertwine. For these late nineteenth century
genteel professionals, privacy enabled one to behave empirically in a
“dignified” manner; but such behavior was conceived primarily as an
outward manifestation of one’s inherent dignity.
William Parent elaborates on the type of intrinsic worth that
75
Gewirth finds at the core of human dignity. Parent’s term, “moral
dignity,” is characterized as “the right not to be arbitrarily and
76
therefore unjustly disparaged as a person.”
Parent thus
characterizes dignity relationally as a function of how we are treated
by others. Ironically, however, he does not seem to appreciate how
personhood and identity themselves may be constructed relationally
through social and historical interaction. Rather, he assumes an
autonomous individual who has certain rights respecting her dignity.
Moreover, his concept of dignity is ultimately negative, involving a
right not to be treated a certain way. There is no sense of dignity as
involving a positive right to flourish as a person. The right to privacy,
in contrast, was valued by Warren and Brandeis not simply because it
allowed the cultured individual to keep out the debasing influences
of a crass modernity, but also because it helped to sustain a space and
a community within which one could realize his full potential as a
77
civilized individual. Just as one may conceive the right to privacy as
more than the negative right simply “to be left alone,” so too may one
73

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.
Id.
75
William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47 (Michael J. Meyer
and W. A. Parent eds., 1992).
76
Id. at 66.
77
See Kahn, supra note 30, at 306-12.
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conceive dignity as more than the negative right not to be
78
mistreated.
IV. PRIVACY AS AUTONOMY
Justice William Brennan has argued that “the Constitution
embodies the aspiration to social justice, brotherhood and human
79
dignity that brought this nation into being.”
Ronald Dworkin
echoes Justice Brennan in identifying a belief in individual human
dignity as “cardinal” in our political culture and in the structure of
80
the Constitution. He characterizes this as a belief “that people have
the moral right—and the moral responsibility—to confront for
themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions, the
most fundamental questions touching the meaning and value of their
81
own lives.” Among these rights is “procreative autonomy” which,
Dworkin notes, has its most available justification in the “privacy”
82
cases. He thus connects privacy to the notion of autonomy and
places both in the context of the broader value of human dignity.
Privacy as autonomy is often conflated with issues of control.
Ferdinand Schoeman characterizes privacy in the context of social
relations as protection “from social overreaching [that] limits the
83
control of others over our lives.” Similarly, Avishai Margalit argues
that governmental invasions of privacy humiliate individuals by
depriving them of control over their lives, or by debasing the value of
84
such control.
Julie Innes, in contrast, has a fairly de-politicized
conception of privacy as “the state of an agent possessing control over
a realm of intimacy, which includes her decisions about intimate
85
informational access, intimate access, and intimate actions.” Innes
goes on to define intimacy as involving choices that draw their
86
“meaning and value from the agent’s love, liking, and care.” Privacy
claims, therefore, are claims to possess “autonomy with respect to our
78

See William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy in American Law, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 254 (1966) (arguing that privacy as a positive right “is an
affirmation of certain aspects of the individual person and his desired freedom from
unreasonable intrusive conduct by others”).
79
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
23 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
80
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 111 (1996).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 110.
83
FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 1 (1992).
84
AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 207 (1996).
85
INNES, supra note 16, at 69.
86
Id. at 91.

2003

PRIVACY—IDENTITY MAINTENANCE

385

87

expression of love, liking, and care.” Innes reduces the value of
privacy to an acknowledgment of respect for persons “as human
88
beings . . . with the potential to freely develop close relationships.”
This sounds appealing, but it is a fairly impoverished conception of
privacy. Innes’s definition gives us no reason for such valuations, nor
does it explain why relations of “intimacy” are more important than
respect for each other as citizens, or simply as human beings. Innes’s
approach, ironically, threatens to efface individuality by valuing the
individual only insofar as she is capable of intimate relations. This
amounts to a sort of psychological reductionism that completely fails
to account for the sort of humiliation identified by Margalit, which
can threaten to undermine the integrity of individual identity and
personhood.
Laurence Tribe, on the other hand, casts autonomy broadly as
89
fully implicating a variety of “rights of privacy and personhood.”
Focusing on the issue of control, he distinguishes privacy from
autonomy in his analysis of Roe v. Wade. The key issue in Roe, he
asserts, is not privacy but autonomy, which he defines in terms of
90
control over one’s body and reproductive destiny. Similarly, Henkin
argues that Supreme Court cases from Griswold to Roe were not really
about privacy, but about recognizing a new “zone of autonomy, of
91
presumptive immunity to governmental regulation.”
Such
distinctions make sense under limited construction, but they depend
on a rather cramped conception that replicates privacy as a function
of distinct social spheres: private and public (or perhaps, private and
not private). This distinction seems reasonable, but it shades into a
descriptive, rather than normative, notion of privacy. It looks first to
where invasions occur rather than to what values such invasions
threaten. If we focus instead on normative privacy as an affirmative
right to maintain the integrity of one’s personhood and identity, the
92
distinction between autonomy and privacy becomes less significant.
Drucilla Cornell takes just such an affirmative approach to
privacy rights when she uses psychoanalytic theory to connect the
93
right to abortion with the concept of bodily integrity. She argues
87

Id.
Id. at 95.
89
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302-1435 (1988).
90
Id. at 1340-54.
91
Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1411 (1974).
92
Thus Ruth Gavison, for example, connects privacy to the affirmative right of
free speech as both related to values of autonomy and self-realization. Ruth Gavison,
Too Early for A Requiem, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437, 461-62 (1992).
93
Drucilla Cornell, Bodily Integrity and the Right to Abortion, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS,
88
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that “the wrong in denying a right to abortion is not a wrong to the
‘self,’ but a wrong that prevents the development of the minimum
conditions of individuation necessary for any meaningful concept of
94
selfhood.” Yet because the conditions of individuation are “social
and symbolic,” Cornell hesitates to characterize the right to bodily
integrity as the right to privacy “if that right is understood as a right
95
to be left alone.” There is, however, no need to bifurcate the right
to bodily integrity from the right to privacy if, as Post and other
scholars suggest, we conceive privacy itself as social and symbolic—a
means of constructing community and the individual, not simply of
96
sheltering oneself from intrusion. Thus understood, the right to
privacy implicates a concern for maintaining the conditions necessary
to sustain normatively valued individuation through which the
integrity of one’s personhood and identity is established and
developed.
V. PRIVACY AND CONTROL OVER INFORMATION
Moving toward the descriptive end of the continuum, one may
view privacy more specifically as a matter of control over certain types
of information. Such control implicates ideals of autonomy but tends
to focus on a more empirical evaluation of the type of information at
issue and the circle or number of people to whom it is exposed.
Thus, for example, we have Tom Gerety’s definition of privacy as “an
97
autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity,” or
Tribe’s discussion of informational autonomy as the right to select to
whom and for what purposes we divulge information about
98
ourselves.
Richard Parker provides a more purely informational
definition of privacy when he asserts that “privacy is control over
99
when and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others.”
Similarly, Ruth Gavison argues that invasions of privacy can be
100
measured in terms of “the extent to which we are known to others.”
Alan Westin asserts that “privacy is the claim of individuals,
RIGHTS 21-22 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
Id. at 22.
95
Id.
96
See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989); Keith C. Boone, Privacy and
Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1983).
97
Gerety, supra note 13, at 236.
98
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1389-90. Tribe, of course, sees privacy as including, but
not limited to, control over information.
99
Parker, supra note 3, at 281 (emphasis omitted).
100
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
AND
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groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
101
what extent information about them is communicated to others.”
102
Westin therefore casts privacy as a type of withdrawal from society.
Following Westin, Randall Bezanson characterizes privacy as “a
103
matter of individual control” over “identified types of personal
104
information” and seeks thereby to “embed [privacy] in the idea of
105
confidentiality.”
Westin and Bezanson’s analyses of privacy are useful for
developing a scheme to regulate attempts by the government or news
media to gain specific types of information about particular
individuals, but they are otherwise quite limited in their conception
of the nature and value of privacy. In particular, they have little to say
about how or why invasions of privacy may implicate dignitary
interests or affect the integrity of one’s personhood or identity. Nor
do they fully consider how the harm caused by loss of informational
control may implicate these values. In his cogent analysis of Warren
and Brandeis’ original elaboration of the right to privacy, Bezanson
recognizes that they were trying to protect “the individual’s right to
enjoy an identity forged by the existing social institutions of family
106
and community.” He then advocates a contemporary version of the
tort based on confidentiality, which raises new questions, such as who
determines what appropriately private information is and according
to what criteria. He mistakenly reduces Warren and Brandeis’
original articulation of a dignitary conception of privacy as “an
attempt to protect the functioning of those discrete social institutions
from the monolithic, impersonal and value-free forces of modern
107
society . . . .”
Warren and Brandeis clearly were trying to impose
certain social norms of genteel bourgeois society, but they opposed
the forces of modernity not because they were “value-free,” but
precisely because of the particular values modernity embodied and
108
enforced.
Bezanson understandably rejects aspects of Warren and
Brandeis’ culturally chauvinistic view of privacy as unworkable and
undesirable in today’s more individualistic, pluralistic, and
101

WESTIN, supra note 1.
Id. at 7.
103
Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change: 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1150 (1992).
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Id. at 1174.
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Id. at 1150.
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Id. at 1138.
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Id. at 1139.
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See generally Kahn, supra note 30.
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democratic society. But characterizing modern society as diverse,
pluralistic, and “value-free” allows Bezanson to finesse the problem of
privacy as a normative value by situating confidentiality as a matter of
109
individual control independent of “external and social norms.”
The problem is that individual control cannot be divorced from
social norms without a complete fragmentation of society. Legal
recognition of privacy interests itself implies and depends upon the
imposition of socially determined limits to privacy. Moreover,
modern society certainly is not value-free, nor does respect for
pluralism and diversity absolve us of a need to employ values to
110
understand, define, and ultimately enforce a right to privacy.
Warren and Brandeis understood this. They were certainly
elitists and their dignitary ideals might have served hegemonically to
enforce certain repressive community norms, but simply identifying
such shortcomings does not solve the problem. The challenge,
rather, is to engage Warren and Brandeis in a discourse to elaborate
an evolving understanding of the relation between privacy and
dignity in order to promote legal practices that more fully recognize
and respect the integrity of individual personhood and identity.
VI. PRIVATE SPACE AND SEPARATE SPHERES
Finally, privacy is perhaps most concretely conceived as a matter
of regulating personal space or boundaries. Privacy is often defined
spatially as involving a realm placed beyond the reach or measure of
111
certain social forces.
From this conception arises the notion of a
private “sphere” as a bounded area separate and apart from both the
world of politics and the market. The notion of “separate spheres,”
evokes feminist critiques of the historical construction of the private
112
sphere as an arena of patriarchal dominance over women.
The
public/private distinction arguably lies at the core of liberal political
and legal thought, but as Carole Pateman notes, “liberalism is
113
inherently ambiguous about the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ . . . .”
109

Bezanson, supra note 15, at 1135.
See Post, supra note 96, at 969 (arguing that common law privacy rests “upon a
concept of privacy that is inherently normative”).
111
See Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
441, 445 (1990); see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology
and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1497-1512 (1983).
112
CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
93-102
(1987).
113
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY 118 (1989).
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Perhaps some of the ambiguity lies in the notion of privacy itself. As
Anita Allen and Erin Mack observe, “‘privacy’ denotes conditions of
physical or informational inaccessibility, such as solitude or secrecy.
But it can also designate ‘the private sphere’ and a degree of
114
autonomy within it.”
Frances Olsen makes an additional and
important distinction within the private sphere between the market
and the family. She argues that similar conceptions of the private
sphere are used to characterize and assess the proper degree and
115
type of state intervention in the marketplace and at home.
Feminist critiques of privacy tend to focus primarily on power
relations within the domestic sphere of family life. Originating in the
changing society of early nineteenth century America, the ideology of
separate spheres posited a dichotomy between the sacred space of the
116
home and the profane world of the market and political life. As the
workplace became separated from the home, the world of commerce
and industry attained a masculine connotation while domestic life
117
became the special province of women. Olsen points out the dual
nature of the family/market dichotomy, arguing that while it “tended
to mask the inferior, degraded position of women, it also provided a
degree of autonomy and a base from which women could and did
118
evaluate their status.” The problem becomes acute, however, when
the ideology of separate spheres is invoked in legal and political
systems to justify state action that effectively ratifies or consolidates
the family as a feudal patriarchal structure. In so far as an ideology of
privacy is used to perpetuate a status quo of hierarchy and
paternalistic dominance of women and children within the domestic
sphere, feminist analysis designates the private sphere an instrument
119
of injustice. For example, in her critique of the logic of Roe v. Wade,
114

Allen & Mack, supra note 111, at 445.
Olsen, supra note 111, at 1497-12.
116
The connection of privacy to “sacred space” hardly ended with the nineteenth
century. In 1966, for example, Milton Konvitz presented privacy as a “sacred
precinct” where the self is beyond or outside the influence of the state. Milton
Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272,
274-77 (1966). In contrast to Warren and Brandeis, however, he used property
metaphors to posit a sort of portable private space that a man can carry with him
wherever he goes. Id. To Konvitz, privacy thus created a breathing space for the
survival of the self in the face of society and the state. Id.
117
For a discussion of the nineteenth century origins of the ideology of separate
spheres of privacy in America, see generally NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD (1977); ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE
(1977); SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, WOMAN’S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING IDEALS
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Catherine MacKinnon characterizes the idea of the “private” as an
instrument of women’s subordination, arguing that “when the law of
privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy, it bars change in control
over that intimacy. The existing distribution of power and resources
within the private sphere will be precisely what the law of privacy
120
exists to protect.”
Nonetheless, Pateman notes that while feminist critiques argue
that public and private spheres “are actually interrelated, connected
by a patriarchal structure,” she also notes that “they do not necessarily
suggest that no distinction can or should be drawn between the
121
personal and political aspects of social life.” Similarly, Susan Moller
Okin notes that “challenging the dichotomy [between public and
private] does not necessarily mean denying the usefulness of a
122
concept of privacy or the value of privacy itself in human life.”
Indeed, the concept of privacy has proven particularly useful when
invoked to place the domestic sphere outside of or beyond the
123
control of market forces.
Thus, Warren and Brandeis placed the
see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 206-08 (1992). Frances Olsen offers an affirmative
vision of potential state action, arguing that “[state] intervention in the family is
desirable insofar as it promotes women’s claims for greater power and tends to
undermine formal family hierarchy; it is undesirable insofar as it promotes
individualism and particularizes and legitimates hierarchy rather than eliminates it.”
Olsen, supra note 115, at 1528.
Iris Marion Young points out the tradition in political theory, going back to
Rousseau and Hegel, to consign women to the private sphere as representing the
body, sensuality, and passion in contrast to their ideal of the universal citizen as
rational, rule-bound, objective, and homogeneous. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 119 (1990). She argues for reconfiguring the notion of
the “private” as what the public excludes to one that defines private “as that aspect of
his or her life and activity that any person has a right to exclude others from.” Id.
Young, however, still employs a dichotomous conception of public and private
based on notions of control over territory that fails fully to consider the socially
constructed nature of those spheres. Nor does her approach to the private sphere
take full account of Olsen’s distinctions between the domestic realms, the market,
and the public realm. Moreover, Young’s emphasis on individual control provides
no basis for evaluating the legitimacy of such claims. For example, an embezzler may
want to keep her business record private. Simply defining privacy in terms of her
right as an individual to keep that information private completely undermines state
power to regulate social affairs. The critical issue is how society determines what type
of information may legitimately be withheld from public view. This implicates issues
of the relational nature of privacy and autonomy discussed below.
120
MACKINNON supra note 112, at 101; see also CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184-94 (1989).
121
PATEMAN, supra note 113, at 132-33.
122
OKIN, supra note 119, at 127.
123
Olsen notes that the egalitarian principles of the free market could help to
“promote women’s claims for greater power and . . . undermine formal family
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“inviolate personality” in such a sphere when they disentangled
privacy from property rights and argued that it was not a material
124
value and hence should not be subject to market forces. The dual
nature of privacy is evidenced by the fact that while Warren and
Brandeis may have disentangled privacy rights from property rights,
their conception of the value of human dignity remained mired in a
separate spheres ideology. Their focus on protecting the “sacred
125
precincts of private and domestic life” valorized the bourgeois
patriarchal family as the source and guardian of spiritual values. As
Allen and Mack note, “the Warren and Brandeis article initiated a
doctrinal revolution in tort law. But the article was business as usual
126
Nonetheless, the fact that their
when it came to gender.”
conception of human dignity reflected the patriarchal norms of their
social class and historical era does not necessarily undermine the
validity of the principle that under the common law of privacy the
power of the state may be (and has been) invoked to protect human
dignity from debasing commodification by market forces.
The problem was not so much in Warren and Brandeis’ basic
conception of privacy as a bulwark against the market as it was their
highly gendered notion of the nature of privacy and human dignity.
Thus, while engaging in a feminist critique of privacy, we must be
careful not to throw out its useful elements. It is necessary, rather, to
read principles of privacy in light of our contemporary
understandings of gender and power in modern society. Although
many feminist critiques focus on how privacy has been invoked for
legitimate state action that maintains domestic patriarchy or keeps
women out of the world of industry, commerce, and politics, more
attention needs to be paid to the ways in which privacy has been used
to initiate state action that protects individuals, not only from the
127
state, but from the market.
hierarchy,” but she does not fully consider the possible harms arising from the
relentless logic of the market which commodifies all things that come within its
ambit. Olsen, supra note 115, at 1528.
124
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 201-05.
125
Id. at 195.
126
Allen & Mack, supra note 111, at 477.
127
Ruth Gavison offers a cogent analysis of many feminist critiques of privacy. See
Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43
(1992). While embracing the move to question the public/private distinction, she
criticizes what she sees as the tendency to fight “the verbal distinctions between
public and private, rather than fighting invalid arguments which invoke them, or the
power structures which manipulate them in unjustifiable ways.” Id. Gavison resists
radical dichotomies between public and private, arguing, in effect, for a continuum
along which entities may be placed: “Although most entities are neither clearly
public nor clearly private, important normative conclusions may still follow from the
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VII. PRIVATE SPACE AS PERSONAL ZONES
Spatial conceptions of privacy not only involve constructions of a
private “sphere” within society, but also involve establishing more
personal “zones” of privacy around the individual. Thus, Arnold
Simmel argues that “every assertion of our right to personal privacy is
an assertion that anyone crossing a particular privacy boundary is
transgressing against some portion of our self. Privacy boundaries,
128
accordingly, are self-boundaries.” Charles Fried also remarks upon
the “spatial” aspect of privacy as a context that fosters “relations of the
129
most fundamental sort.” Fried, like Simmel, therefore characterizes
130
invasions of privacy as threats to “our very integrity as persons.”
Similarly, Edward Shils describes one aspect of privacy as “the
existence of a boundary through which information does not flow
131
from the person who possesses it to others.”
He argues that
“intrusions of privacy are baneful because they interfere with an
individual in his disposition of what belongs to him. The ‘social
space’ around an individual, the recollection of his past, his
132
conversation, his body and its image, all belong to him.”
Echoing
Warren and Brandeis’ concern for man’s spirit, Shils argued that a
person “possesses” these things “by virtue of the charisma which is
inherent in his existence as an individual soul . . . and which is
133
inherent in his membership in the civil community.”
Invasions of
privacy, therefore, threaten the very integrity of the self—and the
community.
Again, however, we see a mingling of descriptive and normative
aspects of privacy. Thus, Thomas Scanlon notes that “zones” of
privacy are not necessarily spatial but are defined and bounded by
134
social convention and norms.
For Simmel, Fried, and Shils,
invasions of privacy involve transgressing both empirical and
normative boundaries. Each invokes empirical spatial concepts to
define privacy, yet argues that invasions of privacy threaten the
“integrity” of the self. The threat involves far more than causing
mere mental distress; it entails the transgression of norms of social
respect due to individuals simply by reason of their membership in a
degree of self- or other-regarding.” Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
128
Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not An Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY: NOMOS XIII 72 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
129
Fried, supra note 12, at 477.
130
Id.
131
Shils, supra note 6, at 282.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Scanlon, supra note 49, at 316-17.
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community—hence it also threatens community. Their analyses
therefore implicate an understanding of identity maintenance (and,
ultimately, community maintenance) as a core concept of privacy.
Robert Post offers a more explicitly normative conception of
private space, asserting that “in the common law, as in everyday life,
issues of privacy refer to the characterization of human action, not to
135
the neutral and objective measurement of the world.”
For Post,
privacy involves basic rules of civility through which a community
136
Invasions of privacy “threaten to exclude” a
constitutes itself.
person from the community by denying the protection of rules of
137
civility.
Under such circumstances, a court verdict can serve to
vindicate the plaintiff and reestablish her as a full member of the
138
community.
Post draws upon Erving Goffman’s notions of “territories of the
self” to elaborate a spatial conception of privacy as normative and
socially constructed. Such territories are contextual; their boundaries
are socially determined and vary according to a wide variety of
factors. Post notes that “Goffman defines a territory as a ‘field of
things’ or a ‘preserve’ to which an individual can claim ‘entitlement
139
to possess, control, use, or dispose of.’”
Like Shils, Post invokes metaphors of possession and ownership
in approaching privacy. The valorization of possession, however,
represents the problem of possessive individualism, whereby the self
140
is defined primarily by the things it possesses.
Such a conception
may efface any notion of a core self that exists in any meaningful way
antecedent to the act of possessing. Thus, for example, just as
Anthony Cohen criticizes Goffman’s conception of the performative
self as reducing selfhood to the “skill and imperatives of
141
performance,” so too does the conception of territories of the self
run the risk of reducing selfhood to “possessed” territory.
More specifically, Post construes the tort of intrusion to lend
135

Post, supra note 96, at 969.
Id. at 970.
137
Id. at 968.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 971 (citing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN
PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28 (1971)).
140
For an insightful discussion of this problem in the context of cultural property,
see Richard Handler, Who Owns the Past? History, Cultural Property, and the Logic of
Possessive Individualism, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE 64 (Brett Williams ed., 1991)
(discussing C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM
(1962)).
141
ANTHONY P. COHEN, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ALTERNATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
IDENTITY 68 (1994).
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“authoritative sanction to the territories of the self.” Conceived of
in these terms, the tort of intrusion serves three purposes:
First, it safeguards the respect due individuals by virtue of their
territorial claims. Second, it maintains the language or “ritual
idiom” constituted by territories, thus conserving the particular
meanings carried by that language. Third, the tort preserves the
ability of individuals to speak through the idiom of territories . . .
143
.

Post invokes Jeffrey Reiman to echo his conclusion that control over
such territories is central to maintaining a sense of oneself as “as an
144
independent or autonomous person.”
For Post, privacy helps to constitute both the community and the
individual. The distinctive character of each, its “identity,” is
sustained through the maintenance of rules of civility. Similarly, C.
Keith Boone also seeks to challenge the notion of privacy as a
function of opposition between individual and community when he
asserts that “like inhalation and exhalation, vital to the functioning of
a larger organism, privacy and community should be understood as
145
contrary and cooperative at the same time.”
While deeply
insightful, Post’s analysis does not fully consider the nature of
identity itself much beyond a person’s sense of herself as
independent. His attention to the social construction of privacy
nicely contextualizes the issue but, like Boone, he still employs a
conception of the liberal individual as bounded and separate.
Recent critical legal scholarship, particularly in the area of
feminist theory, offers a more radical challenge to the very notion of
a bounded self as the relevant focus of rights. Jennifer Nedelsky, for
example, argues that “[w]e need a new conception of the tension
between the collective and the individual, for which boundary is not
146
an apt metaphor.”
She notes that the Constitution’s focus on
property has fostered the development of boundary metaphors in
rights analysis. Yet she also argues that the boundary of the self is not
self-evident. Individual autonomy is not a static characteristic but is
147
relational. Insofar as the individual is defined with reference to the
collective, boundaries become problematic. “What is essential to the
development of autonomy,” Nedelsky concludes, “is not protection
142

Post, supra note 96, at 973.
Id.
144
Id.
145
Boone, supra note 96, at 3.
146
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER
OF CULTURE 162 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
147
Id. at 168.
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against intrusion but constructive relationship. The central question
for inquiries into autonomy (legal or otherwise) is then how to
structure relationships so that they foster rather than undermine
148
autonomy.”
To the extent that boundary metaphors obscure the
149
relational aspect of autonomy, they mask critical power relations.
Jane Mansbridge notes that political conceptions of connectedness
150
She
are “coded” as female while separateness is “coded” as male.
also argues that reconceiving autonomy as requiring a nurturing web
of relations undermines the either/or character of the opposition
151
between individual and community.
Nedelsky and Mansbridge add a gender dimension to Michael
Sandel’s critique of John Rawls’ “original position” for presupposing
152
a picture of the person as an “unencumbered self.”
Sandel notes
that what is most important for the personhood of the
unencumbered self “are not the ends we choose, but our capacity to
153
choose them.”
Sandel argues that such a view denies “the
possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties
154
antecedent to choice . . . .” For Sandel, individual identity is largely
constituted through membership in community: we do not realize
our personhood simply through the choices we make but through
155
our associations and our place in history and society.
This relational understanding of autonomy echoes Post and
Boone’s conceptions of privacy as constituting and being constituted
by community. Privacy, thus, may be conceived as a principle that
recognizes and protects the relations necessary to develop autonomy.
More than this, however, privacy involves protecting relations
through which one develops a sense of oneself as unique, that is, a
sense of identity. Nor is a concern for uniqueness antithetical to a
focus on the relational aspect of identity. Rather, each individual
may develop a distinctive set of relations within and through which
148

Id.
See also Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, Possibilities,
in LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? 219-252 (Allan C. Hutchinson
& Leslie J.M. Green eds., 1989).
150
Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democratic Community, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 351 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).
151
Id.
152
Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, in
COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 18 (Shlomo Avinieri & Avner de-Shalit eds.,
1992).
153
Id. at 19.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 18-24. See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE (1982).
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he or she negotiates a unique identity.
VIII. PRIVACY AND THE INTERESTS OF IDENTITY UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
Because discussions and applications of privacy in the legal
context often cross the boundary between common law and
constitutional principles, it is necessary to consider briefly the current
status of constitutional privacy. This, of course, remains one of the
most controversial areas of modern constitutional law. This is not
intended to review comprehensively the controversies surrounding
privacy, but merely to highlight some of the key themes enunciated
in major privacy cases arising under the Constitution, particularly as
they relate to the recognition of legal interests in identity. In his
discussion of the social foundations of the law of defamation, Robert
Post notes that since 1964 the law of defamation has “been largely
responsive to constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme
Court,” which “has used the First Amendment as a tool to ‘reshape
156
the common law landscape.’”
The same may be said for much of
157
the jurisprudence of privacy. Just as New York Times v. Sullivan
radically changed common law defamation, so too have
constitutional doctrines come to dominate discussions of privacy
158
since Griswold v. Connecticut.
For Bloustein, this connection is
natural, because he sees the principles of dignity as central to both
159
constitutional and common law privacy.
Judith Wagner DeCew argues that similar interests are at stake in
160
both constitutional and common law privacy.
Justice Brandeis
himself provided perhaps the most direct link between them in his
161
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.
In this case the Taft
Court’s majority opinion found inter alia that a state wiretap did not
violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
162
search and seizure.
In an impassioned and somewhat indignant
dissent, Brandeis argued first that “clauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a

156

Robert Post, Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution,
74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 721 (1986).
157
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
158
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
159
Bloustein, supra note 27, at 994.
160
Judith Wagner DeCew, The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics, 5 LAW & PHIL. 145,
173 (1986).
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277 U.S. 438 (1927).
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Id. at 466.
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similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”
This echoes
almost exactly the tone and substance of Warren and Brandeis’
article on the common law right to privacy, published some thirty164
seven years earlier. As discussed below, Warren and Brandeis based
their articulation of the right to privacy on the belief that the
165
common law “grows to meet the new demands of society.”
According to Brandeis, both constitutional and common law privacy
owe their emergence to the adaptation of old legal principles to new
166
circumstances.
More specifically, in his Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis
expressed concern that “subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the [g]overnment . . . by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain
167
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”
The
“progress of science,” he concluded, had furnished government with
168
an ever growing power to intrude into the private life of citizens. A
similar concern for the intrusive power of new technologies pervades
Warren and Brandeis’ article on the common law of privacy—only
there the focus is on private parties, such as the media, using
technology to expose private affairs to the gaze of the urban masses
169
Finally, whereas
and the debasing materialism of the market.
Warren and Brandeis spoke of the common law right to privacy as
170
protecting “man’s spiritual nature” and “inviolate personality,” in
Olmstead Brandeis quoted almost verbatim from his earlier article
when he asserted that constitutional privacy was based on the
Founders’ recognition of “the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
171
of his feelings and of his intellect.” He concluded that “the right to
be left alone [was] the most comprehensive of rights and the right
172
most valued by civilized men.” Brandeis saw both common law and
constitutional privacy, therefore, as central to a civilized community.
Both drew on the sorts of dignitary concerns identified by Bloustein,
the former focusing on private actors, and the latter on the state.
In his discussion of the place of privacy in a decent society,
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 196.
Id. at 205.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
Id.
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Avishai Margalit suggests some distinctions between institutional and
social encroachments on privacy that may be useful in considering
173
the relationship between constitutional and common law privacy.
Margalit first distinguishes between a decent society and a civilized
one:
A civilized society is one whose members do not humiliate one
another, while a decent society is one in which the institutions do
not humiliate people. Thus, for example, one might think of
Communist Czechoslovakia as a nondecent but civilized society,
while it is possible to imagine without any contradiction a Czech
174
Republic which would be more decent but less civilized.

Margalit asserts that a decent society requires that institutions not
175
encroach on personal privacy.
He sees the malicious
encroachments of gossip, which are of such great concern to Warren
and Brandeis, as “more relevant to the question of whether a society
176
is civilized than whether it is decent.”
In each case his primary
concern is for the dignity of the individual or, rather, that the
177
Margalit’s distinctions here nicely
individual not be humiliated.
echo the respective concerns of common law and constitutional
privacy in the United States. Constitutional privacy focuses primarily
on state institutions; common law privacy focuses primarily on
individual social actors.
Margalit notes that both types of
178
encroachments on privacy share the power to humiliate. Similarly,
constitutional and common law privacy ultimately share a concern to
protect the dignity of the individual generally, and the integrity of
her identity in particular. We see this connection most clearly in the
relation between Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy and his dissent in
179
Olmstead.
It is in its concern for the integrity of the individual’s identity
that the jurisprudence of constitutional privacy is most relevant to
173

AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 201-11 (1996).
Id. at 201.
175
Id. at 201.
176
Id. Ferdinand Schoeman sees gossip as existing between the public and private
realms. He argues that norms of privacy may precondition gossip, but that gossip
itself is not the same thing as publicizing something for all to see. Id. at 148-50.
Rather, it is a controlled dissemination of information within a community, which
itself manages and constructs community. Id.
177
MARGALIT, supra note 173, at 204-08.
178
Id. at 201, 203-05.
179
Of course, common law also implicates the power of the state insofar as it
involves its institutions enforcing rules of civility. In this regard, Margalit’s line
between civilized and decent societies blurs, but it does not disappear. Common law
privacy focuses on social interaction among individuals, whereas constitutional
privacy centers on the actions of the state.
174
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this discussion.
Both common law and constitutional privacy
recognize and manage identity. Indeed, it is from common law
privacy that much of constitutional jurisprudence derives its
approach to assessing the legal status of identity in relation to dignity
and individual integrity. Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead makes
this clear. More recently, a similar linking of common law and
constitutional principles of privacy is evident in Justice Stewart’s
concurrence in Rosenblatt v. Baer, where he asserted the following:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection
of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the
right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of
180
our constitutional system.

Justice Stewart effectively used the common law tradition of privacy
and its concerns for the dignity and integrity of the individual to
inform his constitutional reading of the fundamental principles of
constitutional jurisprudence. Our common law tradition of privacy
implicitly informs the Justice’s conception of principles that lie at the
181
“root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”
Laurence Tribe articulates similar considerations to connect two
basic aspects of constitutional privacy. Tribe distinguishes between
“inward-looking” privacy, which demands secrecy, sanctuary, or
seclusion from “outward looking” privacy that relates more to
controlling how one is perceived by others in society. Both privacy
interests, however, are joined by their common recognition of the
182
need “to be master of the identity one creates in the world.”
Thus, when Justice Brandeis construes the wiretaps in Olmstead
as menacing the “spiritual nature” of man, he is articulating a
concern for more than the mere protection of secrets. He argues
that the Constitution should be invoked to protect a sphere in which
the individual can freely maintain and develop his identity. Some of
the early substantive due process cases from the same era articulate
similar concerns for maintaining the integrity of institutions and
practices, such as the family and child-rearing, that were then
perceived as central to maintaining the integrity of individual
180
181
182

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1304.
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183

identity. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a
state law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to
schoolchildren. Decided in the aftermath of the virulent antiGerman sentiment engendered by the First World War, the Court
found that the state had gone too far in trying “to foster a
184
homogeneous people.”
185
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court struck down a
statute requiring children to attend only public schools; that is, the
law prohibited them from attending private or parochial schools.
Citing Meyer, the Court focused on the right of the parents to “direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control” and
declared that “[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
186
State to standardize its children . . . .”
The Court concluded that
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
187
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”
While
certainly evoking images of the family as the private province (and
property) of the male patriarch, the Court’s language also resonates
with Margalit’s construction of the role of privacy in maintaining a
decent society. These cases do not forbid all intrusions by the state
into the life of the family, but they do forbid acts that are perceived to
threaten the integrity of the family and its children. The threats here
involved “homogenization” or “standardization;” that is, acts which
188
effaced the individual identity of family members.
More recently, the Court expressed a similar concern for the
189
integrity of the family in Moore v. City of East Cleveland. In Moore, the
Court struck down a local housing ordinance that limited occupancy
of dwelling units to members of a single family. The ordinance
defined “family” in terms of a few categories of individuals related by
190
blood.
The lower court had found that Moore violated the
ordinance because she lived with her two grandchildren who were
183

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 402. Jill Norgren and Serena Nanda note that the Court’s decision “can
hardly be described as ‘a celebration of cultural pluralism.’ In fact, the Court
expressed considerable empathy and approval of the intent of the Nebraska
legislature . . . .” JILL NORGREN & SERENA NANDA, AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM
AND THE LAW 187 (1988).
185
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
186
Id. at 535.
187
Id.
188
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
189
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
190
Id. at 496.
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191

cousins.
In his opinion for a four justice plurality, Justice Powell
asserted that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life” was protected by the Due Process Clause of the
192
Fourteenth Amendment. Citing a long list of cases beginning with
Meyer and Pierce, Powell declared that the Court “ha[s] consistently
acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot
193
enter.’”
After expounding on the “sanctity of the family” as a
194
source and transmitter of “cherished values,” Powell echoed Pierce,
in his conclusion that “the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain
195
narrowly defined family patterns.”
The intrusion of the state into the construction of the family
unit implicates precisely the type of institutional humiliation that
concerned Margalit. Margalit aptly noted that one of the central
motifs of the humiliation caused by institutional violation of privacy is
196
“rejection, that is, exclusion from the ‘Family of Man.’” The Court
in Moore gave this figurative construction of the human family a literal
application. The state’s refusal to recognize or respect the integrity
of the plaintiff’s familial unit humiliated her as an individual and
effaced (standardized) her individuality.
Privacy principles also inform constitutional law in other forms
197
of association.
Bloustein in particular proposes an explicit link
between individual privacy and the right of association. “The right to
be let alone,” he asserts, “protects the integrity and dignity of the
individual. The right to associate with others in confidence—the
right of privacy in one’s associations—assures the success and
198
integrity of the group purpose.”
Perhaps the case most clearly
199
embodying Bloustein’s concerns is NAACP v. Alabama. In this case,

191

Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 499.
193
Id. (citations omitted).
194
Id. at 503-04.
195
Moore, 431 U.S. at 506.
196
MARGALIT, supra note 173, at 204. Kenneth Karst’s work focuses extensively on
the constitutional aspects of the rights and harms implicated by institutional
exclusion of individuals from the political community. See KENNETH KARST,
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
197
There is, of course, extensive First Amendment jurisprudence on the right of
association. As with the other areas of constitutional law I touch upon, my purposes
are best served simply by highlighting some areas where common law principles
seem to inform or overlap with constitutional jurisprudence.
198
Edward Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 219,
278 (1977).
199
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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the Supreme Court barred the state of Alabama from requiring the
local NAACP chapter to disclose its membership lists, asserting that
the Court “has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to
200
associate and privacy in one’s associations.” The Court then stated
that “[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
201
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”
Beyond the explicit references to privacy, the Court’s focus on
“dissident beliefs” also evidences a concern to resist the sort of
202
standardization that it decried in Meyer, Pierce, and Moore. Whereas
personal and familial privacy protect the conditions necessary for
people to realize their individual identities, the political context of
NAACP v. Alabama indicates that respect for one’s associations
protects the conditions necessary for a decent society to realize its
identity as a democracy.
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s most forceful articulation of the
privacy-based identity interests implicated by the right of association
203
is found in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
In this case, the Court
found that the application of a state law to compel the Jaycees to
accept women as regular members did not violate their First
204
Amendment right of association.
Justice Brennan found that the
basis of associational rights lay in a group’s relation to sustaining and
developing the identity of individual members:
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may
underlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that
certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity
and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the State . . . . Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to

200

Id. at 462.
Id.
202
Citing NAACP v. Alabama, Tribe notes that “[t]he presentation of the self is . . .
inescapably linked to rights of association,” but he goes on to caution that
associational rights have a dual character “as sources of power to exclude unwanted
persons and behaviors while including in one’s circle those with whom affinity is
felt.” TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1313.
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468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Id. at 628-29.
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define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.

Here Justice Brennan invoked the First Amendment to protect the
social processes and relations through which individuals form and
sustain their identities. His concern to maintain a buffer between the
individual and the state echoes Margalit’s concerns regarding the
206
role of privacy in a decent society.
Justice Brennan, indeed,
asserted a type of associational privacy along the lines Bloustein had
earlier articulated. Again, as with common law privacy, the basic goal
is to legally recognize, define, and protect the integrity of individual
identity, or, as Justice Brandeis termed it, the “spiritual nature of
207
man.”
Tribe also notes the identity-based concerns articulated by the
Supreme Court in cases relating to vocation, travel, control over
208
personal information, and appearance. After analyzing Hampton v.
209
Tribe asserted that the state may not
Mow Sun Wong,
constitutionally “take away without clear and focused justification . . .
a fair opportunity for an individual to realize her identity in a chosen
210
vocation.”
211
Similarly, in his discussion of Shapiro v. Thompson, Tribe notes
that travel may be valued both “as an aspect of expression or
education, and . . . as a means of changing one’s place of residence
and beginning life anew. Both dimensions of personal mobility are
212
important in fleshing out the notion of personhood . . . .”
The
“fleshing out [of] personhood” by “begin[ning] life anew” directly
implicates dignitary interests in the construction and maintenance of
one’s identity. Tribe moves on to discuss the individual interest in
“controlling one’s informational traces” largely as a matter of
213
“outward looking” privacy.
He reviews a wide array of Supreme
Court cases relating to “system[s] of governmental informationgathering,
information-preservation,
and/or
information

205

Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
See MARGALIT, supra note 173, at 201-08.
207
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.
208
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1375-89.
209
426 U.S. 88 (1976) (a case involving heightened scrutiny of a Civil Service
Commission rule “barring all noncitizens from employment in the federal
competitive civil service”).
210
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1378.
211
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating the denial of welfare benefits to people who
had not resided in the jurisdiction for at least a year as an unconstitutional burden
on the fundamental right to travel).
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TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1382-83.
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Id. at 1389.
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214

dissemination,” and argues that when such systems threaten the
individual’s control over information about himself or herself, they
implicate “a basic part of the right to shape the ‘self’ that one
215
presents to the world . . . .”
Tribe is also critical of the tendency by most courts to reject
constitutional challenges to state-imposed regulations of appearance,
such as hair length and clothing. He argues that “one need not
regard a person’s hair length as fully equivalent to speech in order to
perceive that governmental compulsion in this realm invades an
216
important aspect of personality.”
Tribe laments the Supreme
217
Court’s decision in Kelly v. Johnson,
which upheld a police
department’s regulation of officers’ hairstyles and expressed special
concern for regulations that affect young people for whom “the
freedom to shape one’s personality through appearance” is
218
In each of these areas, Tribe is elaborating
“fundamental.”
constitutional doctrines that are ultimately grounded in a legal
recognition not only of the general value of human dignity, but of its
more particularized manifestation as it bears on maintaining the
conditions necessary for individuation—the realization of one’s
distinctive identity as a unique human being.
Finally, and most obviously, constitutional privacy has become
deeply identified with issues of control over one’s body and
reproductive autonomy. Here the issues of control over one’s body
raised in Kelly are elevated to a higher level of significance. If the
literature on other aspects of constitutional privacy is extensive, the
debates and discussions surrounding reproductive autonomy are
seemingly endless. I will attempt only a brief review of some key
aspects of particular cases as they bear on legal interests related to the
recognition, protection, and/or construction of identity.
219
The Supreme Court’s holding in Griswold v. Connecticut,
striking down a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives or
214

Id.
Id. at 1389-90.
216
Id. at 1386.
217
425 U.S. 238 (1976).
218
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1388-89. The relationship between state regulation of
appearance and the individual’s interest in the integrity of her persona becomes
more problematic when it implicates First Amendment rights to the free exercise of
religion. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding a military
regulation forbidding an Orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke while on duty).
This takes us beyond our immediate concerns with privacy into a large area of
constitutional doctrine characterized by Tribe as involving “rights of religious
autonomy.”
219
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counseling others in their use, provides a good starting point. Citing
such cases as Meyer, Pierce, and NAACP v. Alabama, Justice Douglas
posited a general theory of privacy as a constitutional right by
alluding to the “penumbras” formed by “emanations” from the more
220
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
Like Margalit, Justice
Douglas clearly articulates a conception of privacy as a bulwark
against humiliating and degrading state intrusions. “Would we,” he
cautioned, “allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
221
Indeed
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”
prior to the “emanations” from “penumbras,” Justice Douglas
asserted that “we deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school
222
system.”
Justice Goldberg took up this theme in his concurrence,
using the Ninth Amendment to cast “marital privacy” as an
unenumerated “fundamental right” derived from the traditions and
223
collective conscience of our people. Similarly, Justice Harlan found
that the law violated “basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
224
liberty.’”
These opinions construct privacy as a pre-political value
basic to a decent society. In this regard, the principles they invoke
share a common genealogy with those first articulated by Warren and
Brandeis. Both types of privacy demand that the law recognize and
protect the integrity of the individual.
225
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court used Equal Protection analysis
to extend the safeguards of Griswold to unmarried couples. The case,
however, was really about the right to privacy, as was evident from
Justice Brennan’s assertion in his opinion for the majority that if “the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions
into matters so fundamentally affecting a persona as the decision
226
whether to bear or beget a child.”
227
Finally, in Roe v. Wade, the Court extended the right of privacy
to cover the regulation of access to abortion. The Court held that the
right to privacy was “fundamental” and encompassed personal
228
decisions regarding abortion.
Therefore, any state regulation of
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. at 484.
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 452 (emphasis in original).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153.
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abortion could only be justified if it served a compelling state
229
Although as a practical matter the right to abortion and
interest.
access to reproductive health services have been seriously eroded in
the years since Roe, the Supreme Court somewhat ambiguously
reaffirmed the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade” in Planned Parenthood
230
v. Casey. While rejecting Roe’s trimester framework and freeing the
states to impose regulations on abortion as long as they do not
impose an “undue burden” on the woman’s right of privacy, the
unprecedented joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter nonetheless asserted that “regardless of whether exceptions
are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any
woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her
231
pregnancy before viability.”
Ronald Dworkin praised the decision
as a “clear endorsement of a basic right to free choice about abortion
until the fetus is viable,” but he also cautioned that “we must not
forget that . . . four justices announced themselves still determined to
232
overrule Roe v. Wade.” One more vote could significantly alter the
terrain of constitutional privacy as we have come to understand it
over the past twenty-five years.
233
In Bowers v. Hardwick, a case upholding the arrest of a
homosexual man under a Georgia criminal sodomy statute, the Court
set harsh limits on the right to privacy and personal autonomy. In a
sharply divided decision, the Court refused to extend the right to
privacy to cover acts of homosexual sodomy between consenting
234
adults.
Justice White’s majority opinion distinguished the earlier
line of privacy cases, asserting that “no connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
235
on the other has been demonstrated . . . .” In the more recent case
236
of Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy used Equal Protection analysis to
invalidate an amendment to Colorado’s state constitution that
forbade localities from enacting ordinances outlawing discrimination
against homosexuals.
Although not expressly based in the
jurisprudence of privacy, the Court’s assertion that “a State can not so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws” is grounded in a similar
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237

concern to respect the basic humanity of all citizens.
William Parent criticizes both Griswold and Eisenstadt for their
238
failure to adequately define privacy. The “right to be left alone,” he
239
asserts, is too broad to be meaningful.
He sees the intrusions
involved in the cases as more offensive to liberty than to privacy. Yet
he argues against a retreat from the sort of substantive due process
analysis found in the cases. Rather, he advocates the need to develop
“rigorous disciplined reasoning aimed at constructing credible
criteria for distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable forms of
240
government intrusion.”
DeCew, in turn, challenges Parent’s claim that post-Griswold
241
cases spuriously conflate privacy and liberty.
She argues that
Parent’s conception of privacy, because it simply involves personal
information that is not part of a public record, is too narrow to
242
encompass the true concerns of privacy jurisprudence.
DeCew
asserts that privacy encompasses “not only information but activity
243
She allows for cultural variation in
and physical access as well.”
conceptions of privacy by characterizing “the realm of the private” as
a function of certain “social conventions” that help establish
“whatever is not the legitimate concern of others, where those others
are individuals in tort cases, the government for constitutional
244
claims.” This is all well and good, particularly the concern for the
social construction of the realm of privacy. But DeCew’s analysis
leaves unanswered the question of legitimacy, how it is established,
and which (and whose) social conventions count in determining it.
This can only be done by considering explicitly how the courts have
construed the nature of the harm(s) caused by invasions of privacy as
a basis for elaborating specific reasons for why our culture has
237
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historically valued privacy. This brings us back to the question of
human dignity and the integrity of individual identity.
The concern for individual integrity has led many
commentators, including Tribe, to characterize the right of privacy as
articulated in Griswold and elaborated on in Roe as more a matter of
245
personal autonomy than of privacy.
Grant Mindle, however, has
been careful to point out some differences between Brandeis’
246
“privacy” and Tribe’s “autonomy.”
Regarding the first edition of
Tribe’s formidable American Constitutional Law, Mindle asserts the
following:
to Brandeis, the right to privacy is the right to conceal elements of
our being from society at large. But to Laurence Tribe, his
intellectual heir, privacy so defined is insufficient to guard the
dignity of man. In lieu of privacy, Tribe would speak of
247
autonomy.

He argues that Tribe casts privacy more as a form of public
248
expression—the right to control one’s public reputation.
He
identifies “the gulf that separates Brandeis’ approach to privacy” from
249
Tribe’s by referring to Stanley v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court
invoked the right of privacy to strike down a law that punished private
individuals for possessing obscenity.
Mindle contrasts Tribe’s
comment that upholding the statute in Stanley would have led “either
to a flattening or a repression of Stanley’s inner self,” with “Brandeis’
determination to use the law to guard against the ‘lowering of social
250
standards and of morality.’”
Mindle’s contrast is well taken and it is important not to elide
245

See TRIBE, supra note 89, at 1340-54; see, e.g., Louis Henkin, Privacy and
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Id. at 592.
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Id. Mindle also comments on the difficulty of adequately defining “privacy”
and “autonomy.” Therefore, he decides “in lieu of defining privacy and autonomy
with reference to their subject matter . . . . I have focused instead upon their
underlying presupposition—that the law should endeavor to protect Americans in
their emotions and sensations.” Id. at 576. While a reasonable approach, I believe
that Mindle’s identification of the presuppositions of privacy and autonomy is
seriously flawed.
249
394 U.S. 577 (1969).
250
Mindle, supra note 247, at 592-93.
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the real differences between various conceptions of the right to
privacy. But neither should we minimize the deeper continuities.
Mindle’s conclusion that Brandeis articulated the right to privacy “to
guarantee the right of the individual to retire from public life, at least
temporarily, and having done so to seek solace and spiritual renewal
251
within the confines of his domestic circle,” is not inaccurate so
much as it is narrow and limited. Such concerns did animate
Brandeis’ immediate efforts, but his understanding of the law as a
living, growing thing led him to place far more emphasis on the
deeper principles of recognizing and protecting the dignity and
integrity of the individual’s persona or “spiritual nature.” Similarly,
Mindle’s assertion that Brandeis’ vision of privacy (as thus
characterized), “is a far cry from what privacy has come to mean—the
right to behave in public with little if any regard for the feelings of
252
others,” seems to reduce contemporary concerns for autonomy to a
species of ill-mannered narcissism. Mindle’s view of autonomy
overlooks continuing and vibrant (if occasionally eclipsed) concerns
that share, in modified form, Brandeis’ concerns for dignity and
individual integrity. Indeed, one might argue that autonomy matters
to Tribe (and others) precisely because it is viewed as central to
sustaining the type of distinctive, unique individual that Brandeis too
sought to protect. Brandeis’ normative ideal of a cultured, genteel
individual might not comport well with Tribe’s defense of Stanley, but
each in his own way sees privacy as a means to protect not only the
individual but also individuality—individual identity—from being
standardized, repressed, or effaced by the forces of modern life, be
they social, economic, or governmental.
CONCLUSION
The concept of privacy, thus, resists any bright-line treatment,
such as that given by other commentators and the courts. Their
diverse stratification of privacy between differing spheres and
differing definitions is not the fault of the individual critics or judges.
I am not suggesting that privacy is an amorphous concept, which
constantly resists typical classification and definition. Any attempt to
bind privacy into one sphere is resisted by its application to another.
Attempts to classify and define the right to privacy are, thus, defeated
by the underlying needs to diversity and split the concept so as to
make it less broad.
First, existent literature on the subject sub-textually points to a
251
252
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definition of privacy that protects the person from the intrusive
nature of the (external) market. Privacy has evolved into a
mechanism for defining identity beyond the forces of the
marketplace. Commentators should, therefore, consider privacy with
means outside the normative descriptions of property. As a matter of
normative conception, then, privacy is the social mechanism for
protection of the individual from intrusion, and not merely the
descriptive means for the protection of an individual’s rights in
property.
Despite critical attempts to dissect the concept of privacy along
conceived lines of dignity, individuality, and spatial relations, privacy
should not be considered as a fragmented reality. Rather, it is best
considered as one combined theory of social interaction with the
marketplace. Privacy is, thus, not a collection of diverse theories of
societal interactions between differing spheres, but rather a unifying
principle that is itself the means for creating the notions of dignity
and identity that critics often use in defining privacy.
Finally, privacy is best thought of as part of a larger continuum
of rights. It is not an encompassing sphere, but rather a point along
a line, that is free to move between the normative and descriptive, as
well as between concepts of identity and dignity. Privacy should not
be conceptualized as the mere means of protecting property, but as a
tool for formulating identity. Critics would be better served by
formulating individual points along that line, than attempting the
unduly broad and onerous task of providing one sweeping definition
of privacy.

